18-19 July
Keynotes
Maria Alvarez (King’s College London)
Jonathan Webber (Cardiff)
Submitted papers
Rei Takahashi (Oxford): Group Well-Being and the Objection from the Consciousness Requirement
Lewis Williams (Oxford): Beyond Normativity
Jay Jian (Academia Sinica): Putting Things in Order
Reuven Brandt (San Diego): Procreative Obligations and a Directed Duty of Care
Lilith Lee (VU Amsterdam): How is False Consciousness Bad For an Agent?
Ripley Stroud (UNC): When Disagreement Sours: Defining Gaslighting
Joe Slater (Glasgow): A Silver Lining to the Apocalypse: Clued-Up Consequentialists
Austen McDougal (Princeton): Fitting Partiality and Selflessness Together
12-13 July
Keynotes
Prof. Helen Frowe (Stockholm)
Prof. Jonathan Webber (Cardiff)
Submitted papers
Thomas Byrne (UCLA): ‘Saving and Letting Live’
James Chamberlain (Sheffield): ‘Towards a Humean Theory of Moral Intuition’
Fiona Woollard (Southampton): ‘When Should a Parent Count as a Mother? Gender and Normative Motherhood’
Rutger van Oeveren (UT Austin) and J.J.W. Wieland (VU Amsterdam): ‘Participation and Collective Harm’
Leora Sung (UCL): ‘Time Bias and Altruism’
Max Hayward (Sheffield): ‘Yes We Can! Optimism, Cooperation, and the Rationality of Collectively Self-Fulfilling Beliefs’
Jules Holroyd (Sheffield): ‘Proleptic Praise: A Functionalist Account’
Brandon Yip (ANU): ‘Why and How You Should Be a Moralist’
11-13 July
Keynote addresses
Prof. Pamela Hieronymi (UCLA): Making Excuses and the Blame Game
Prof. Kieran Setiya (MIT): Human Nature, History, and the Limits of Critique
Submitted papers
Lucia Schwarz: Nonnaturalism, Morality’s Normativity, Ineffability, and Metaphors
Nicholas Smyth: The Return of the Philosopher-King: Conceptual Engineering, Consequentialism and Social Authority
Andrew Peet and Eli Pitcovski: Holding onto Grief
Moya Mapps: Getting Personal: A Feminist Perspective on Philosophical Methodology
Kristen Hine: Is it Permissible to Select Abortion When Ectogenesis is an Alternative?
Owen Clifton: Contractualism and Non-Identity
Patrick Butlin: Well-being, agency and the individual evaluative perspective
Bart Streumer: Superspreading the Word
12th--14th July
Unfortunately we were not able to run a conference in 2020, due to the pandemic. Papers selected for 2020 were presented in an online Annual Conference in 2021 instead.
Keynote addresses
Alison Hills (Oxford), ‘Obligations: Moral and Aesthetic’
David Enoch (HU Jerusalem) ‘Politics and Suffering’
Submitted talks
Jasmine Gunkel (USC) ‘Do I Really Have to Say “Feed Two Birds with One Scone”?’
Robert Hartman (Tulane) ‘Moral Luck, Humility, and Benevolence’University of Glasgow
Jordan MacKenzie (Virginia Tech) ‘Self-Deception as Self-Defeat’
Nick Makins (LSE) ‘Moral Doubt, Uncertainty and Ambivalence’
Daniel Miller (West Virginia) ‘When Moral Ignorance is an Excuse’
Yonatan Shemmer (Sheffield) ‘Treating as a Reason’
Vilma Venesmaa (Helsinki) and Teemu Toppinen (Helsinki) ‘An Expressivist Explanation for Our Knowledge of Normative Supervenience’
16--17 September. For the first time, BSET ran an additional conference, reserved for papers by graduate students.
Stina Björkholm, ‘Hybrid descriptivism and the practicality challenge’
Daniele Conti, ‘Reasons and Their Strength: Why Libertarians Should Be Nozickean’
Samuel Dishaw, ‘Justifying, Apologizing and the Value of Shared Moral Understanding’
William Gildea, ‘The Moral Status of Humans and Animals: Towards a New View’
Dane Leigh Gogoshin, ‘Shaping Moral Agency’
Luca Stroppa, ‘The Problem of Lives Worth Living’
17--18 July
Keynote Addresses
Deliberation and Fetish,
– Professor Nomy Arpaly (Brown)
The Value of Competition
– Professor David Owens (Kings College London)
Submitted Talks
Does Stereotyping Constitute Discrimination?
– Erin Beeghly (Utah)
First-Personal Trauma Narratives and the Demands of Empathic Listening
– Zoë Cunliffe (CUNY Graduate Center)
On the ‘Badness’ of Being Unforgiving
– Simone Gubler (Texas, Austin)
Generic Moral Grounding Claims
– Julian Jonker (Pennsylvania)
Moral Constraints on Gender Concepts
– Nicholas Laskowski (California State, Long Beach)
Moral Deference and Moral Speech Acts
– Max Lewis (Pennsylvania)
Why Epistemic Reductionism won’t save the Moral Error Theorist
– Alex Murphy (Cambridge)
What is the Question to Which Anti-Natalism is the Answer?
– Nicholas Smyth (Fordham)
Poster Presentations
The Repugnant Conclusion and Quality of Life
– Christopher Cowie (Durham)
Making Peace with Moral Imperfection: the problem of temporal asymmetry
– Camil Golub (Rutgers-Newark)
Prostitution and the Good of Sex: a reply to Settegast
– Natasha McKeever (Leeds)
A Feminist Critique of Feminist Metaethics
– Stephen Ingram (Manchester)
12-13 July
Keynote Addresses
Hard Choices
– Professor Ruth Chang (Rutgers)
Espionage and Treason
– Professor Cécile Fabre (Oxford)
Submitted Talks
Error and the Limits of Quasi-Realism
– Graham Bex-Priestley (Sheffield)
Expectations and Obligations
– Matej Cibik (Pardubice)
Doing, Allowing, Gains and Losses
– Camilla Francesca Colombo (LSE)
The Bleakness of Telic Subjectivism
– Alexander Dietz (Southern California)
On Harming Beneficiaries of Humanitarian Intervention
– Linda Eggert (Oxford)
Sentimentalism About Moral Understanding
– Nathan Howard (Southern California)
The Right to Parent as a Project
– Benjamin Lange (Oxford)
Reason Holism, Individuation, and Embeddedness
– Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu (Chung Cheng )
Poster Presentations
Why and When is Pure Moral Motivation Defective?
– David Heering (Leeds)
Affirmative Action for Non-Racialists
– Julian Jonker (Pennsylvania)
Motivational Difficulty and Moral Demandingness
– Joe Slater (St Andrews / Stirling)
Rights Against High-Risk Impositions
– Fei Song (Hong Kong)
What We Owe … To Whom?
– Bastian Steuwer (LSE)
Reflective Blindness, Depression and the Motivational Account of Unpleasant Experiences
– Elizabeth Ventham (Southampton)
Kant and the Wisdom of Oedipus
– Alice Pinheiro Walla (Bayreuth)
10-11 July
Keynote Addresses
An Incomplete Enlightenment
– Professor Janet Radcliffe Richards (Oxford)
Sentimentalism and Realism in Epistemology and Ethics
– Professor Peter Railton (Michigan)
Submitted Papers
Justification Incorporated: A Discursive Approach to Corporate Responsibility
– Eva Buddeberg (Goethe-Universität Frankfurt) and Achim Hecker (Privatuniversität Schloss Seeburg)
Explaining the Paradox of Hedonism
– Alexander Dietz (Southern California)
Personal Value, Biographical Identity, and Retrospective Attitudes
– Camil Golub (NYU)
The Explanation Proffering Norm of Moral Assertion
– Mona Simion (Oslo)
Judgment Internalism: An Argument from Self-Knowledge
– Jussi Suikkanen (Birmingham)
Moral Uncertainty for Deontologists
– Christian Tarsney (Maryland)
Moral Advice and Joint Agency
– Eric Wiland (Missouri – St Louis)
11--12 July
Keynote Speakers
Rethinking ‘One Thought Too Many’
– Professor Marcia Baron (Indiana)
Aesthetic Prescriptions and Moral Prescriptions
– Dr Simon Kirchin (Kent)
Submitted Papers
Epistemic Perceptualism and Epistemic Reason-Responsiveness
– Robert Cowan (Glasgow)
Expressivism and Realist Explanations
– Camil Golub (NYU)
Practical Reason, Sympathy and Reactive Attitudes
– Max Hayward (Columbia)
The Fundamentality of Fit
– Christopher Howard (Arizona)
Rationality as Government by Reason
– Antti Kauppinen (Tampere)
The Paradox of Deprivation Reduction and Inequality
– Julia Mosquera (Reading)
Discounting and the Fallacy of Division
– Matthew Rendall (Nottingham)
Enkrasia for Non-cognitivists
– Teemu Toppinen (Helsinki)
13--14 July
Keynote Speakers
What is the Opposite of Wellbeing?
– Professor Shelly Kagan (Yale)
Between Privacy and Transparency
– Baroness Onora O’Neill (Cambridge and House of Lords)
Submitted Papers
How Encounters with Values Generate Moral Demandingness
– Sophie Grace Chappell (Open University)
Welfare as Autonomous Flourishing
– Garrett Cullity (Adelaide)
A Moral Argument Against Moral Realism
– Melis Erdur (Tel Aviv)
Justifying Partiality
– Errol Lord (Pennsylvania)
What is Demandingness?
– Brian McElwee (Oxford)
Can There Be Positive Human Rights?
– Adina Preda (Limerick)
Perspectival Luck
– Bernhard Salow (MIT)
The Function of Morality
– Nick Smyth (Brown)
14 – 16 July
Keynote Speakers
Transcendent Forgiveness and the Possibility of Affirmation
– Miranda Fricker (Sheffield)
Ageing as a Normative Phenomenon
– Samuel Scheffler (NYU)
Submitted Papers
The Myth of Balanced Consequences
– Samuel Elgin (Yale)
Making Sense of Moral Perception
– Rafe MacGregor (York)
Contextualism about Moral Responsibility
– Emily McTernan (UCL)
Love and Agency
– Adrienne Martin (Pennsylvania)
What the Utilitarian Cannot Think
– Mark Nelson (Westmont)
Kant’s Moral Theory and Demandingness
– Alice Pinheiro Walla (Trinity College Dublin)
Are There Any Conflicts of Rights?
– Adina Preda (Limerick)
Do Moral Reasons Explain Anything?
– Ben Sachs (St Andrews)
Cryptonormative Judgements
– Alex Worsnip (Yale)
15 – 17 July
Keynote Lectures
No-Fault Responsibility for Outcomes
– Robert M. Adams (UNC Chapel Hill)
Free Speech and Pornographic “Speech Acts”
– Jennifer Hornsby (Birkbeck)
Submitted Papers
The Problem of Ethical Vagueness for Expressivism
– Nicholas Baima (Washington St Louis)
Oughts First
– Antti Kauppinen (Trinity Dublin and Jyväskylä)
Expressivism and Mind-Dependence: Distinct Existences
– Sebastian Köhler (Edinburgh)
What it Takes to be Wrongfully Exploited
– Hallie Liberto (Connecticut)
On the Identity of Motivating and Normative Reasons
– Susanne Mantel (Saarland)
Objective Well-being
– Andrew Moore (Otago)
Resolute Quasi-Realism
– Nicholas Smyth (Brown)
Expressivism and the Normativity of the Mental
– Teemu Toppinen (Helsinki)
The New Problem of Numbers in Morality
– Fiona Woollard (Southampton)
9 – 11 July
Keynote Speakers
Aristotle in the Light of Bernard Williams
– Sarah Broadie (St Andrews)
Who Should Turn the Trolley?
– Frances Kamm (Harvard)
Submitted Papers
Science’s Immunity to Moral Refutation
– Alex Barber (Open)
Specialising General Duties
– Stephanie Collins (ANU)
Cognitivism about Moral Judgement
– Alison Hills (Oxford)
Another Error in the Error Theory?
– Wouter Kalf (Leeds)
Expressivism, Subjectivism and Moral Disagreement
– Sebastian Kohler (Edinburgh)
Priority and Desert
– Matthew Rendall (Nottingham)
Divine Commands and Secular Demands: On Darwall on Anscombe on Modern Moral Philosophy
– Robert Stern (Sheffield)
Contractualism and the Conditional Fallacy
– Jussi Suikkanen (Birmingham)
Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning
– Jonathan Way (Southampton)
11 – 13 July
Keynote Speakers
Prioritarianism and the Separateness of Persons
– Mike Otsuka (UCL)
Good-for-nothings
– Susan Wolf (UNC Chapel Hill)
Submitted Papers
A Locative Analysis of “Good For”
– Guy Fletcher (Oxford)
A Darwinian Dilemma for Anti-Realist Theories of Value
– Abraham Graber (Iowa)
Direction of Fit
– Alex Gregory (Reading)
A Lover’s Shame
– Ward Jones (Rhodes)
Rule Consequentialism and Disasters
– Leonard Kahn (US Air Force Academy)
A New Research Programme For Radical Constructivism
– Yonatan Shemmer (Sheffield)
A Hostage Situation
– Saul Smilansky (Haifa)
Giving Each Person Her Due: Taurek Cases and Non-Comparative Justice
– Alan Thomas (Tilburg)
Have We Solved The Non-Identity Problem?
– Fiona Woollard (Southampton)
7 – 9 July
Keynote Speakers
James Dreier (Brown)
Tim Mulgan (St Andrews)
Submitted Papers
Value Incomparability and Indeterminacy
– Cristian Constantinescu (Cambridge)
A New Theory of Well-Being
– Jennifer Hawkins (Duke)
Sentimentalism and Deontological Intuitions
– Antti Kauppinen (Amsterdam/Trinity College Dublin)
Faith in Humanity
– Ryan Preston-Roedder (UNC Chapel Hill)
Fairness Between Competing Claims
– Ben Saunders (Oxford)
Should We Be Sorry That We Exist?
– Saul Smilansky (Haifa)
Can We Believe the Error Theory?
– Bart Streumer (Reading)
Thick Concepts and Variability
– Pekka Vayrynen (Leeds)
Taking the Ideal out of Nonideal Theory: Institutional Design as Failure Analysis”
– David Wiens (Michigan)
13 – 15 July
Keynote Addresses
Pleasure, Desire, and Practical Reason
– James Lenman (Sheffield)
Intention, Permissibility, Terrorism, and War
– Jeff McMahan (Rutgers)
Submitted Papers
Objective versus Subjective Moral Oughts
– Krister Bykvist (Oxford)
Practical Bracketing
– Garrett Cullity (Adelaide)
Truth and Error in Morality
– Dale Dorsey (Kansas)
Moral Blameworthiness and the Reactive Attitudes
– Leonard Kahn (US Air Force Academy)
Owning Up and Lowering Down: The Power of Apology
– Adrienne Martin (Pennsylvania)
Shapelessness and the Thick
– Deborah Roberts (Reading)
Second-Order Equality and Levelling Down
– Re’em Segev (Hebrew, Jerusalem)
Non-monotonicity and Moral Particularism
– Alan Thomas (Kent)
Cynicism and Morality
– Samantha Vice (Rhodes)
14 – 16 July
Keynote Addresses
Kant and the Necessary Lie: How ‘Good’ Ends Can (sometimes) Justify ‘Bad’ Means
– Barbara Herman (UCLA)
Utilitarianism by Way of Preference Revision: Making Sense of Hare’s Argument
– Wlodek Rabinowicz (Lund)
Submitted Papers
Practical Reflection and Agential Authority
– Carla Bagnoli (Wisconsin-Milwaukee)
The Composition of Reasons
– Campbell Brown (Edinburgh)
Minimalist Semantics and the Problem of Creeping Minimalism
– William Dunaway (Southern California)
Wrongness and Reasons
– Ulrike Heuer (Leeds)
Expressivism and Certitude
– Krister Bykvist (Oxford) and Jonas Olson (Oxford)
The Asymmetry Argument
– Martin Peterson (Cambridge)
Holism, Weight and Undercutting
– Mark Schroeder (Southern California)
The Distinctive Wrong in Lying
– Alan Strudler (Pennsylvania)
Defending the Wide-Scope Approach to Instrumental Reason
– Jonathan Way (California Santa Barbara)
9 – 11 July
Keynote Addresses
Compassion and Beyond
– Roger Crisp (Oxford)
Improvised Values
– David Velleman (NYU)
Submitted Papers
The Heart of Forgiveness
– Lucy Allais (Witwatersrand)
Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t
– Frances Howard-Snyder (Western Washington)
Virtue Ethics and Deontic Restraints
– Mark LeBar (Ohio)
Duress, Deception and the Validity of a Promise
– David Owens (Sheffield)
Are There Irreducible Normative Properties?
– Bart Streumer (Reading)
Against Cognitivism about Normative Judgement
– Teemu Toppinen (Helsinki)
Should Losses Count? A Critique of the Complaint Model
– Alex Voorhoeve (LSE)
A New Argument against Rule Consequentialism
– Chris Woodard (Nottingham)
Moral Schizophrenia and the Paradox of Friendship
– Scott Woodcock (Victoria, Canada)
10 – 12 July:
Keynote Addresses
[Insert title here]
– Mark Timmons (Arizona)
Reason, Reasons, and Normativity
– Joseph Raz (Oxford and Columbia)
Submitted Papers
Realism, Rational Action, and the Humean Theory of Motivation
– Melissa Barry (Williams College)
Marriage, Morality and Institutional Value
– Elizabeth Brake (University of Calgary)
What is the Integrity Objection an Objection to?
– Tim Chappell (The Open University)
Reasons and Decisions
– Garrett Cullity (University of Adelaide)
A Recognitional Conception of Appraisal
– Jules Holroyd (Sheffield)
Does Ethical Theory Imply a Contradiction?
– Andrew Moore (Otago)
Trust and Obligation
– Philip Nickel (California Irvine)
The Misunderstood Demandingness Objection
– David Sobel (Bowling Green State )
Korsgaard: Actions, Reasons, Laws
– Ariela Tubert (North Carolina Chapel Hill)
11 – 13 July
Keynote Addresses
Moral Obligation and Accountability
– Stephen Darwall (Michigan)
The Autonomy of Morality
– John Skorupski (St Andrews)
Submitted Papers
Moral Lumps
– Samantha Brennan (Western Ontario)
Choice, Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities
– Vivienne Brown (The Open University)
Agency, Smagency: Why Normativity Won’t Come From What is Constitutive of Action
– David Enoch (The Hebrew University)
An Argument Against Reduction in Morality
– Jeremy Koons (American University of Beirut)
Radically Response-Dependent Value
– Mark LeBar (Ohio)
Good For and Reasons
– Robert Pulvertaft (Copenhagen)
What Even Consequentialists Should Say About the Virtues
– Luke Russell (Sydney)
Wisdom and Perspective
– Valerie Tiberius (Minnesota)
Ethical Naturalism and Moral Twin Earth
– Andrea Viggiano (Bologna)
12 – 14 July
Keynote Addresses
[Insert Title Here]
– Allan Gibbard (Michigan)
Fairness
– Brad Hooker (Reading)
Submitted Papers
Severe Poverty as a Human Rights Violation
– Elizabeth Ashford (St. Andrews)
Ethical Instrumentalism and Functional Normative Significance
– Joseph Biehl (Cork)
Seeing by Feeling: Virtue Ethics and Moral Perception"
– Justin D’Arms and Dan Jacobson (Ohio State and Bowling Green State)
Intrapersonal Aggregation
– Iwao Hirose (Oxford)
Kind Words and Cruel Facts
– Antti Kauppinen (Helsinki)
Selflessness and Cognition
– Lawrence Lengbeyer (United States Naval Academy)
The Missing Formal Proof of Humanity’s Radical Evil in Kant’s Religion
– Seiriol Morgan (Leeds)
Pain For Objectivists
– David Sobel (Bowling Green State)
On The Tedium of the Good
– Samantha Vice (Rhodes)
21 – 23 July
Keynote Addresses
Disentangling Disentangling
– Simon Blackburn (Cambridge)
Sentimentalist Moral Realism
– Michael Slote (Miami)
Submitted Papers
Practical Conflicts and Reasons for Regret
– Monika Betzler (California, Berkeley)
The Embodiment Thesis
– Jon Garthoff (California, Los Angeles)
Emotional Self-Awareness and Ethical Deliberation
– Michael Lacewing (Heythrop)
Three Dogmas of Response Dependence
– Mark LeBar (Ohio)
Conditionalism about Final Value
– Jonas Olson (Uppsala)
Promising and Testifying
– David Owens (Sheffield)
Nietzsche and Korsgaard's Kant
– Mathias Risse (Harvard)
Hume and Motivating Reasons
– Constantine Sandis (Reading)
Substance and Procedure in Theories of Prudential Value
– Valerie Tiberius (Minnesota)
Particularism and Default Reasons
– Pekka Vayrynen (California, Davis)
25 – 26 July
Keynote Addresses
Why Naturalism?
– David Copp (Bowling Greeen State)
Luck, Responsibility, and the 'Natural Lottery'
– Susan Hurley (Warwick)
Submitted Papers
Future People
– Chris Belshaw (The Open University)
Desire, Pleasure, and Wholehearted Activity
– Talbot Brewer (Virginia)
Practical Rationality for Pluralists about the Good
– Tim Chappell (Dundee)
Who can be wronged? An Existential Challenge to Contractualism
– Rahul Kumar (Pennsylvania)
Moral Valence, Defeasibility, and Privileged Conditions
– Margaret Little and Mark Lance (Georgetown)
Rationality and Reflection
– Jeff Seidman (Oxford)
Consequentialism, Deontology, and the Greatest Good
– Sergio Tenenbaum (Toronto)
Group Based Reasons for Action
– Christopher Woodard (Warwick)
13 – 15 July
Keynote Addresses
Reasons
– John Broome (Oxford)
Evaluation, Uncertainty and Motivation
– Michael Smith (Australian National University)
Submitted Papers
Pessimism
– George Harris (College of William and Mary)
Pleasure and the Worst Form of Akrasia
– Devin Henry (King's, London)
Virtue Ethics on 'Right'
– Robert Johnson (Missouri)
Autism, Empathy and Moral Agency
– Jeanette Kennett (Monash)
Against Blameless Wrongdoing
– Elinor Mason (Colorado)
Contempt as a Moral Attitude
– Michelle Mason (Minnesota)
Autonomy's Many Normative Presuppositions
– Henry Richardson (Georgetown)
Acting with Feeling from Duty
– Julie Tannenbaum (California, Los Angeles)
Practical Reason and the Stability Standard
– Valerie Tiberius (Minnesota)
13 – 16 July
Keynote Addresses
Some Thoughts about Scanlon's Contractualism
– Gerald Dworkin (California, Davis)
Two Sources of Morality
– Philip Pettit (Australian National University)
Submitted Papers
Rethinking Our Maxims
– Talbot Brewer (Virginia)
Autonomy, Slavery, and Mill's Critique of Paternalism
– Alan Fuchs (Colllege of William and Mary)
The Reconstruction of Teleology in Contemporary Metaethics
– Jonathan Jacobs (Colgate)
Virtue Ethics and Emotional Conflict
– Kristján Kristjánsson (Akureyri)
Utilitarianism and the Meaning of Life
– Thaddeus Metz (Witwatersrand)
Moral Testimony and its Authority
– Philip Nickel (California, Los Angeles)
Are Practical and Theoretical Reasoning Independent?
– Bart Streumer (Reading)
The Argument from the Persistence of Moral Disagreement
– Folke Tersman (Stockholm)
16 – 18 July
Keynote Addresses
Post-Humanist Reflections on a Socratic Thesis: 'No One Acts Against Their Better Judgement'
– Sabina Lovibond (Oxford)
Hume and Kant – but not Hume versus Kant – on Normative Authority
– Peter Railton (Michigan)
Submitted Papers
Ethical Objectivity and the Adequacy of Internal Criticism
– James Cornwell (Oxford)
Sympathy, Discernment and Reasons
– Garrett Cullity (St Andrews)
The Magnetism of the Good and Ethical Realism
– Irwin Goldstein (Davidson College)
Two Standpoints of Moral Agency
– Susan Hahn (Harvard)
The Natural, The Reductive and the Normative
– Anthony Hatzimoysis (Manchester)
Virtue Ethics and Situationist Personality Psychology
– Maria Merritt (California, Berkeley)
The Moral Law and Moral Laws
– Philip Stratton-Lake (Reading)
Moral Compromises, Moral Integrity and the Objectivity of Plural Values"
– Theo van Willigenburg (Erasmus, Rotterdam)
4 – 6 September
Keynote Addresses
Group Rights
– James Griffin (Oxford)
Three Conceptions of Rational Agency
– R. Jay Wallace (Humboldt, Berlin)
Submitted Papers
Could There Be A Virtue Theory In Ethics?
– Garrett Cullity (St Andrews)
Rule Consequentialism's Dilemma
– Iain Law (St Andrews)
Abortion And Gestation Without Consent
– Maggie Little (Georgetown)
Do Consequentialists Have One Thought Too Many?
– Elinor Mason (Reading)
Response-Dependence Without Reduction
– Alex Miller and Duncan McFarland (Birmingham)
The Price Of Anti-Reductionism
– Ralph Wedgwood (MIT)
An Argument For Normative Realism
– Nick Zangwill (Glasgow)
4 – 6 September
Keynote Addresses
Why Should I Be Virtuous?
– Rosalind Hursthouse (The Open University)
Mapping Moral Motivation
– David McNaughton (Keele)
Submitted Papers
Moderate Intuitionism and the Epistemology of Moral Judgment
– Robert Audi (Nebraska, Lincoln)
True to Ourselves
– Jan Bransen (Utrecht)
Friendship and Moral Danger
– Jeanette Kennett (Monash)
Considerations on Obligation
– Margaret Gilbert (Connecticut)
Moral Generalities Revisited: The Radical Case for Moderate Moral Particularism
– Maggie Little (Georgetown)
Interpersonal Reasons
– Ken O'Day (Bristol)
Why the Doctrine of Double Effect Cannot Solve the Trolley Problem
– William Sin (Hong Kong)
Expressivism, Negation and the Frege-Geach Problem
– Nick Unwin (Bolton Institute)
Response to Unwin
– Paul McNamara (New Hampshire)
28 March
Keynote Speakers
In Defence of Thick Concepts
– Jonathan Dancy (Reading)
The Contingent and the Contemptible
– James Lenman (Lancaster)
Against Moral Empiricism
– Nick Zangwill (Glasgow)